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Marconi in the UK and, most recently,
Royal Ahold in the Netherlands,
corporate governance has received a lot
Introduction
Promoted by corporate scandals such as
Enron and WorldCom in the US,
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Abstract This paper analyses whether good corporate governance leads to higher
common stock returns and enhances firm value in Europe. Throughout, this study uses
Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings for companies included in the FTSE Eurotop
300. Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003, ‘Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 107–55), portfolios are built
consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies and their performances are
compared. The impact of corporate governance on firm valuation is also examined. The
results show a positive relationship between these variables and corporate governance.
This relationship weakens substantially after adjusting for country differences. Finally, the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is analysed, as
approximated by net profit margin and return on equity. Surprisingly, and contrary to
Gompers et al. (2003), a negative relationship is found between governance standards
and these earnings-based performance ratios for which possible implications are
discussed.
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of attention in the financial community.
Institutional investors have started
evaluating what role corporate
governance should play in their
investment policies. The McKinsey
‘Global Investor Opinion Survey’ shows
that 15 per cent of European institutional
investors consider corporate governance
to be more important than a firm’s
financial issues, such as profit
performance or growth potential.
Additionally, 22 per cent of European
institutional investors are willing to pay
an average premium of 19 per cent for a
well-governed company.1 Although this
evidence demonstrates the interest in
corporate governance, the important
question of whether good corporate
governance leads to higher stock returns
and consequently to higher firm
valuations has received limited attention
in the academic literature.
For the US market, Gompers et al.
(2003) analyse the relationship between
corporate governance and long-term
equity returns, firm value and accounting
measures of performance. Their results
clearly support the hypothesis that
well-governed companies outperform
their poorly governed counterparts.
Well-governed companies have higher
equity returns, are valued more highly,
and their accounting statements show a
better operating performance. These
findings should encourage investors in
US companies to consider corporate
governance in their investment
decisions.
Relatively few studies on this issue
have investigated the European case. This
paper is intended to fill this gap.
Following Gompers et al. (2003), it
builds portfolios consisting of
well-governed companies and compares
their long-term equity returns with
portfolios composed of poorly governed
firms adjusted for style, country and
sector exposures. Subsequently, the
impact of corporate governance on firm
valuation as measured by Tobin’s q is
examined. Finally, the effect of corporate
governance on firm performance is
analysed. Two earnings-based ratios are
used to approximate firm performance:
net profit margin (NPM) and return on
equity (ROE).
Although similar hypotheses to those
of Gompers et al. (2003) are examined,
the research design differs in various
respects. This is mainly due to the
different dataset available for Europe.
Since the dataset consists of two currency
areas, the UK and the European
Monetary Union (EMU), it was decided
to analyse them separately. Besides, this
approach gives significant insight
regarding the different impact of
corporate governance in these two
regions. Throughout this research, the
corporate governance ratings of Deminor,
which cover most companies included in
the FTSE Eurotop 300, will be used. An
advantage of this dataset is that Deminor
is evaluating approximately 300 different
governance criteria per firm. Therefore,
the data provide a very comprehensive
description of each firm’s governance
system. The main drawback, however, is
that ratings are only available for two
years, 2000 and 2001. To overcome this
problem, the analysis is extended
backwards, assuming constant governance
ratings for a limited number of years. As
shown in the data description below, this
approach seems reasonable.
The remainder of this paper is
organised as follows. The next section
briefly summarises the empirical research
on corporate governance. The third
section provides a description of the
database that is used throughout the
analysis. In the fourth section, the main
empirical results are presented. Finally,
conclusions are drawn, and the
implications of the results for investors
are discussed.
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of the portfolios, their results show an
amazing annual excess return of 16.4 per
cent to a corporate governance long-short
strategy.
The empirical literature on the
relationship between firm value and
corporate governance usually analyses
either differences between countries and
their impact on firm value or inter-firm
variation within a country. The most
prominent example of the first type of
study is LaPorta et al. (1999), who
investigate differences in governance
standards among 27 countries. Their
evidence shows that firms incorporated in
countries with better governance standards
tend to have a higher valuation. Examples
of the second type of studies investigating
inter-firm variation within one country
are Drobetz et al. (2004) for Germany,
Gompers et al. (2003) for the US, De
Jong et al. (2001) for the Netherlands and
Black (2002) for Russia. These studies
generally find a positive relationship
between governance standards and firm
value. Comparing the findings of these
studies, it is worth noting that the
relationship seems to be stronger in
countries with less developed standards.
There is rather less empirical literature
which examines the impact of a complete
set of governance standards on firm
performance approximated by profitability
ratios. Most studies instead investigate the
impact of a single governance
characteristic on firm performance. Again,
the approach of Gompers et al. (2003) is
followed. Their evidence shows that
superior governance standards positively
affect firm performance as measured by
NPM and ROE in the US.
Data description
Deminor’s corporate governance ratings
are used to measure the companies’
quality of governance. The ratings cover
between 249 and 269 firms included in
The empirical corporate
governance literature
This brief survey of prior empirical
research is structured along three lines.
First, research on the relationship between
long-term equity returns and corporate
governance is discussed. This is followed
by an overview of empirical research on
the association between corporate
governance and firm value. Finally, the
impact of corporate governance on firm
performance is examined.
Two closely related academic studies
focusing on corporate governance and
long-term equity returns are by Gompers
et al. (2003) and Drobetz et al. (2004).
Gompers et al. (2003) analyse the impact
of 24 governance provisions on stock
returns for about 1,500 US firms from
1990 to 1999. They construct portfolios
consisting of firms with numerous
anti-takeover amendments (‘Dictatorship
Portfolio’) and portfolios including firms
with very few amendments (‘Democracy
Portfolio’). Subsequently, they examine
the returns to holding a long position in
the Democracy Portfolio and a short
position in the Dictatorship Portfolio. This
long–short strategy yields an average
annual return of about 8.5 per cent after
adjusting for factor exposures of the
portfolios using the Carhart (1997) model.
Drobetz et al. (2004) analyse the impact of
corporate governance on stock returns
over the period 1998–2002 in Germany.
Owing to the fact that their corporate
governance data are limited to one
observation, March 2002, they assume
constant historical ratings. To construct
their sample, Drobetz et al. (2004) sent
out questionnaires to 253 German firms in
different market segments and received
answers from about 36 per cent of these
firms. In line with Gompers et al. (2003),
Drobetz et al. (2004) also build factor
portfolios consisting of well-governed
versus poorly governed firms. After
accounting for different factor exposures
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the FTSE Eurotop 300 over the period
2000–01. They are based on about 300
different criteria, which can be attributed
to four broader categories: ‘Rights and
Duties of Shareholders’, ‘Range of
Takeover Defences’, ‘Disclosure on
Corporate Governance’ and ‘Board
Structure and Functioning’. In turn, a
short overview of each category is given
and some descriptive statistics are shown,
which give considerable insight into the
characteristics of the data.
Within the first category ‘Rights and
Duties of Shareholders’, Deminor
evaluates whether shareholders can exert
sufficient power to determine corporate
action. Deminor assesses, for instance,
whether the voting structure of the
company and its procedures are favourable
for shareholders. Shareholders should be
able to file items on the agenda and
counterproposal before as well as during
the General Meeting. Further, according
to Deminor’s standards, the pre-emptive
rights of existing shareholders should be
guaranteed to ensure that their voting
power cannot be diluted. The second
category ‘Range of Takeover Defences’
evaluates whether the likelihood of a
hostile take-over is significantly decreased
by the adoption of anti-takeover
amendments. According to Deminor’s
rating standards, incumbent management
should not be able to block a take-over
attempt at the expense of shareholders.
Category three ‘Disclosure on Corporate
Governance’ measures whether
shareholders are able to obtain convenient
and comprehensive information about the
company’s financial matters as well as its
governance characteristics. For instance,
the firm should release information on
their board members, structure and
committees as well as its remuneration
and stock option plans. Within category
four, Deminor analyses the firm’s board
structure and functioning. Important
evaluation criteria in this category are the
composition and election of the board
members as well as remuneration and
functioning.
To examine whether companies
performing better in one of these
categories also tend to outperform with
respect to another category, the
cross-sectional correlations of the four
different categories are analysed. With
the exception of ‘Rights and Duties of
Shareholders’, all categories are
significantly correlated. As expected, all
categories are also significantly correlated
with the total rating. These results clearly
show that superior (or inferior)
governance standards tend to persist
across different dimensions. This paper
will therefore focus on the companies’
overall governance rating.
Governance standards do not only
seem to be persistent across different
dimensions, but also over time. The
time-series correlations of the four
categories as well as the total rating are
well above 0.8 and significant at the 1
per cent level. Despite the fact that it
would obviously be an improvement to
have data available for a longer time
horizon, these findings support our
assumption of constant relative
governance ratings over time.
Throughout the empirical analysis, the
2000 ratings will be employed backwards
until 1997 to obtain meaningful results.2
To explore whether sectors or
countries differ between each other with
respect to their governance standards,
Tables 1 and 2 present sector and
country averages, respectively. It is
interesting to note that there are large
and statistically significant differences
between countries. Differences between
sectors remain rather small. These
findings suggest that corporate
governance is strongly determined by
country law. Throughout the empirical
analysis, country as well as sector effects
will be adjusted for. Although sector
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value-weighted corporate governance
factor portfolios were constructed. All
firms were ranked on the basis of their
corporate governance rating for the
European Monetary Union (EMU) and
the UK sample, respectively. For the
EMU, the 20 per cent of companies with
the highest corporate governance rating
are assigned to the ‘Good Governance
Portfolio’. The bottom 20 per cent are
allocated to the ‘Bad Governance
Portfolio’. For the UK, quartiles are built
instead of quintile portfolios owing to the
smaller size of the sample. The portfolio
construction method deviates from that of
Gompers et al. (2003). They construct
their portfolios based on the absolute
score of a firm while the portfolios in this
study are determined by the relative score
of a firm versus the complete sample. In
this way, it is ensured that the portfolios
are about equal with respect to total
market capitalisation.
effects seem to be rather small in the
corporate governance ratings, it should
be ensured that the results are neutral
with respect to sector exposures. Besides,
the financial data, such as stock returns,
Tobin’s q, ROE etc. might also be
influenced by sector effects.
The financial data employed in the
analysis are commonly used in academic
research. These data were obtained from
different Factset libraries, mainly from
Worldscope. Whenever appropriate,
financial data are used in the empirical
analysis which were publicly available at
the respective point in time to avoid
look-ahead bias.
Empirical analysis
Corporate governance and stock returns
To analyse the impact of corporate
governance on equity returns,
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Table 1 Sector deviations
No. of No. of 
Mean 2000 observations Mean 2001 observations
Industry (t statistic) in 2000 (t statistic) in 2001
Basic Material and Energy 20.37 25 22.01 25
(0.83) (0.77)
Consumer Cyclical (Auto & Cyclical Goods) 18.26 25 19.22 25
(–0.85) (–1.35)
Consumer Cyclical (Media & Retail) 20.37 23 22.53 27
(0.85) (1.06)
Consumer Non–Cyclical (Good & Services) 18.73 24 21.36 29
(–0.45) (0.24)
Financial (Banks) 20.33 38 20.72 34
(0.92) (–0.32)
Financial (Financial Services and Insurances) 19.14 24 20.46 30
(–0.16) (–0.44)
Healthcare 20.79 11 20.66 14
(0.63) (–0.17)
Industrial 20.54 35 22.58 37
(1.05) (1.50)
Technology & Telecommunications 16.79 26 19.63 31
(–1.96) (–1.16)
Utilities 17.71 18 20.47 17
(–1.26) (–0.32)
Average Rating 19.39 249 21.03 269
Note: Table 1 gives an overview of the average rating of each sector in 2000 and 2001, respectively. T statistics
are stated in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the sector mean
and the sample mean.
From these portfolios, equally
weighted returns to a zero investment
strategy are computed.3 The investor is
holding a long position in the ‘Good
Governance Portfolio’ and a short
position in the ‘Bad Governance
Portfolio’. Without any adjustments for
market risk or differing firm
characteristics, this zero-investment
strategy leads to an annual return of 2.1
per cent for the EMU portfolio and 7.1
per cent for the UK portfolio from
January 1997 to July 2002. Thus, a zero
investment portfolio would have earned
a positive return in both regions. The
central question is whether this finding
can be explained by market risk and
other common factors determining
common stock returns or whether it is
attributable to differences in governance
standards.
As documented by Fama and French
(1992, 1993), stock returns are, next to
market risk (‘beta’), affected by a firm’s
market capitalisation (‘size’) and
book-to-market ratio (BM) (‘value’
versus ‘growth’). Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) showed that future returns might
also be influenced by past returns
(‘momentum’). To account for these
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Table 2 Country deviations
No. of No. of 
Mean 2000 observations Mean 2001 observations
Country (t statistic) in 2000 (t statistic) in 2001
Belgium 15.16** 8 15.88** 10
(–6.34) (–6.90)
Denmark 12.46* 3 14.89* 5
(–3.29) (2.96)
Finland 21.81 4 21.44 5
(1.02) (0.22)
France 17.94 40 20.88 39
(–1.70) (–0.12)
Germany 18.23 24 19.75 26
(–1.20) (–1.40)
Greece 16.42 3 na na
(–1.04) (–)
Ireland 29.40** 4 27.74* 3
(14.14) (4.79)
Italy 17.96* 24 19.03* 23
(–2.04) (–2.57)
Netherlands 13.31** 20 15.45** 18
(–7.53) (–4.40)
Norway na na 15.81 3
(–) (–2.38)
Portugal 8.80** 3 na na
(–14.89) (–)
Spain 13.92** 10 14.47** 10
(–8.91) (–7.43)
Sweden 18.68 19 18.57* 22
(–0.59) (–2.16)
Switzerland 13.24** 15 14.28** 15
(–4.50) (–4.07)
UK 25.84** 71 27.01** 79
(9.52) (8.96)
Average rating 19.39 248 20.99 258
Note: Table 2 presents the average rating of each country in 2000 and 2001, respectively. T statistics are stated
in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the country mean and the
sample mean.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
classified as ‘winners’. The bottom 30
per cent are classified as ‘losers’. Each
month, the return on the losers’ portfolio
is subtracted from the return on the
winners’ portfolio.
The results of estimating Equation (1)
are shown in Table 3. The first row
presents the regression estimates for the
UK. As indicated by the alpha, the
performance differential between the
Good Governance and the Bad
Governance Portfolios is about 6.8 per
cent annually. With respect to size, value
versus growth and momentum, the
portfolios do not seem to differ
substantially. The only significantly
positive coefficient is 1, which reveals
that the Good Governance Portfolio has
a higher exposure to market risk than
the Bad Governance Portfolio has. The
EMU results look very different from the
UK results. The alpha decreases after
adjusting for factor exposures from about
2.1 per cent to 1.6 per cent. A large part
of the performance differential
documented above can be attributed to
differences in size, style and momentum.
As shown by the positive value versus
growth coefficient and the negative size
coefficient, well-governed companies can
be classified as large-cap value in the
Eurozone. The highly significant HML
coefficient indicates that sector effects
might bias results. To sector adjust the
returns of the corporate governance
portfolios, the respective sector return IS
subtracted from each firm’s return and
the market return added. The factor
portfolios for this specification are
constructed sector neutral. The results of
sector-adjusted regressions, shown in
Table 3 (row 3 and 4), support the
proposition that sector exposures affected
the results of the EMU sample. After
sector adjusting, differences in style
between the good and bad governance
portfolio are eliminated. The HML
coefficient basically equals zero. Further,
factors, the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model is employed, which is estimated
by
RLSt  1(RmtRft)2SMBt
3HMLt4MOMtt (1)
where RLSt is the monthly return of the
zero-investment portfolio, Rmt is the
monthly return on the market portfolio,
and Rft is the monthly risk-free interest
rate. SMBt (small minus big) is the
monthly return on a size factor portfolio.
HMLt (high minus low) is the monthly
return on a book-to-price
factor-mimicking portfolio based on the
book-to-market ratio. MOMt
(momentum) is the monthly return on a
momentum factor portfolio. The constant
alpha () represents the excess return an
investor could have earned pursuing this
investment strategy.
The factor portfolios SMB and HML
are constructed following the method of
Fama and French (1993). In line with
the corporate governance portfolios, they
are built value-weighted. The SMB
portfolio is based on the firms’ market
capitalisation at the end of June. The
companies with the lowest 30 per cent
of market capitalisation are defined as
‘small’. The top 30 per cent of firms are
defined as ‘big’. The return on the
portfolio of ‘big’ companies is subtracted
from the return on the small cap
portfolio. The HML factor-mimicking
portfolio is constructed in a similar way.
The 30 per cent of companies with the
highest BM are included in the ‘value
portfolio’. The bottom 30 per cent are
defined as ‘growth portfolio’. The return
on the growth portfolio is subtracted
from the return on the value portfolio.
Momentum (MOM) is generally
constructed as defined by Carhart (1997).
To construct the MOM portfolio, the 30
per cent of firms with the highest
11-month returns lagged one month are
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the alpha increases to about 3.0 per cent.
The UK alpha declines to about 4.6 per
cent after sector adjustments.
Since the descriptive statistics discussed
earlier indicated that the corporate
governance ratings exhibit significant
country differences, country exposures of
the portfolios are also adjusted for. To
adjust the returns of the corporate
governance factor portfolios for country
effects, the same procedure is employed
as previously in the sector-adjusted
analysis. The respective country return is
subtracted from each firm’s return and
the market return is added. While the
sector returns are estimated based on the
authors’ own sample, the return of each
country included in the EMU portfolios
is represented by the respective MSCI
country index. The reason is that the
sample size for some countries is
extremely small. For example, Portugal is
represented in the 2000 portfolios with
only three companies. Computing a
country return from such few
observations would not be a realistic
proxy of the return of the country’s
stock market. Instead, the respective
MSCI country index is used. As
previously shown in the sector-adjusted
analysis, the factor mimicking-portfolios
for size (SMB), style (HML) and
12-months return MOM are also
constructed country neutral. The results
are presented in Table 3 (row 6). It is
striking to see that the HML coefficient
again becomes positive and highly
significant. This indicates that sector
effects again influence the results. The
alpha reduces to about negative 1.0
per cent.
Overall, some evidence is found that
corporate governance affects common
stock returns positively. For the UK
sample, the regression constants () are
consistently positive, though statistically
insignificant at the 5 per cent level.
Comparing the present results for the
UK with those of Gompers et al. (2003)
for the US, it is observed that the size of
the constants is similar. One main
difference is that they were able to
collect 10 years of data. To analyse
whether the results are statistically
significant as the number of observations
increases, it would be worthwhile
repeating the analysis when more years
of data are available. This is also essential
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Table 3 Performance evaluation regressions
 Rm–Rf SMB HML MOM
Style corrected
UK 6.83 0.25** –0.11 –0.10 –0.03
(1.32) (3.09) (–0.62) (–0.89) (–0.37)
EMU 1.58 –0.04 –0.40** 0.46** –0.15*
(0.36) (–0.78) (–3.08) (3.44) (–2.01)
Style and sector corrected
UK 4.63 –0.02 –0.15 0.19 –0.04
(1.16) (–0.37) (–1.21) (1.49) (–0.30)
EMU 2.97 0.06 –0.22 0.04 –0.22*
(0.79) (1.35) (–1.88) (0.31) (–2.01)
Style and country corrected
EMU –1.04 –0.04 –0.12 0.59** –0.07
(–0.26) (–0.85) (–1.00) (4.47) (–0.97)
Note: Table 3 shows the results of the performance evaluation regressions, Equation (1), for the EMU and UK
sample respectively. Besides correction for style exposures using the Carhart model, sector and country effects
are also adjusted for. T statistics are stated in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
performance significantly affect firm
valuation. Therefore, the firms’ ROE is
included in the current and in the
previous year as control variables. The
following cross-sectional regression
equation is estimated for every year t.
Qit  1CGit2BVit3AGEit
4ROEit5ROEi(t– 1)
5SDitit (2)
where CGit is the logarithm of the firm’s
governance rating, BVit is the logarithm
of the book value of assets and AGEit is
the logarithm of the firms’ age in years.
The foundation of the firm is
approximated by the first trading day.
ROEit and ROE(t– 1) are the firm’s ROE in
the current and in the previous year,
respectively. SDit represents a vector of
sector dummies. This regression equation
is estimated annually from 1996 to 2001.
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973),
the time-series mean and t statistics are
computed from the annual regressions.
As in the previous section, the equation
is estimated separately for the two
currency areas, the EMU and the UK.
Table 4 presents the results. In the
EMU, the impact of corporate
governance on firm value is rather
strong. The coefficients of corporate
governance are consistently positive in all
annual regressions. The time-series
coefficient is significantly positive at the
1 per cent level. On average, a 1 per
cent increase in the corporate governance
rating results in a 0.14 per cent increase
in Q. The relationship between
corporate governance and firm value is
not nearly as strong in the UK. The
time-series coefficient is statistically
insignificant and close to zero. One
possible explanation for the different
results of the UK versus the EMU
sample is that the EMU sample consists
of several countries. It was found earlier
in this paper that corporate governance
to examine the robustness of the
conclusions.
For the EMU sample, the alphas are
positive, though statistically insignificant,
for most specifications. It seems that
sector and country effects, which require
more investigation, affect the EMU
results. An avenue for further research
would be to account for sector and
country effects within one specification.
This will be feasible as a longer
time-series of governance ratings is
available for Europe.
Corporate governance and firm value
If better-governed firms tend to have
higher stock returns, this should in the
long run, ceteris paribus, translate into a
higher firm valuation. Consequently, the
following investigates to what extent
corporate governance is already
accounted for in stock prices.
Tobin’s q (Qit) is used as the measure
of firm valuation. Tobin’s q is defined as
the market value of assets divided by the
replacement value of assets. The market
value of assets is represented by the sum
of the book value of assets and the
market value of common stock
outstanding. From this, the sum of book
value of common stock and balance
sheet deferred taxes is subtracted. The
replacement value of assets is represented
by the book value of assets. Although
there are more sophisticated measures of
Tobin’s q, this simple approximation is
chosen to ensure data availability for
most of the sample.
To separate the impact of corporate
governance from other factors affecting
Tobin’s q, multivariate regression analysis
is used. In line with Gompers et al.
(2003) as well as Shin and Stulz (2000),
the firms’ book value of assets and the
firms’ age are accounted for. Further,
Daines (2001) and Yermack (1996)
showed that current and past
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standards differ significantly between
countries. Therefore, the strong CG
coefficient observed in the EMU could
be due to country effects, which have
previously been documented by LaPorta
et al. (1999). To investigate this
possibility further, Equation (2) is
re-estimated including country dummies:
Qit  1CGit2BVit3AGEit
4ROEit5ROEi(t– 1)
5CDitit (3)
where CDit represents a vector of
country dummies. All other variables are
defined as in Equation (2). The results
presented in Table 4 (column 3) are
more ambiguous than the sector-adjusted
findings. Despite the fact that the
time-series coefficient is still positive and
reasonable in size, it is not statistically
significant. Four of the annual
coefficients are positive, of which one is
statistically significant at the 5 per cent
level. Two are negative, though
insignificant.
Overall, these results indicate that firm
valuation is positively related to the
quality of governance standards in the
EMU. This relationship is rather strong
before country adjusting and becomes
weaker after accounting for country
differences.
Corporate governance and firm
performance
There are, generally speaking, two
reasons why good corporate governance
increases firm value. First, good
governance increases investor trust.
Investors might perceive well-governed
firms as less risky and apply a lower
expected rate of return, which leads to a
higher firm valuation. Secondly, as shown
for example by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), better-governed firms might have
more efficient operations, resulting in a
higher expected future cash-flow stream.
This section examines the impact of
corporate governance on operating
efficiency as approximated by the NPM
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Table 4 Corporate governance and firm value
Sector–adjusted results Country adjusted results
EMU UK EMU
Year CG coefficient CG coefficient CG coefficient
1996 0.13 0.09 0.25
(0.89) (0.52) (1.44)
1997 0.17 –0.03 0.38*
(1.21) (–0.14) (2.25)
1998 0.14 0.23 0.05
(0.98) (1.03) (0.30)
1999 0.13 0.13 –0.17
(0.85) (0.44) (–0.77)
2000 0.10 –0.19 –0.06
(0.72) (–0.64) (–0.32)
2001 0.19 –0.15 0.16
(1.16) (–0.69) (1.00)
Mean 0.14** 0.01 0.10
(11.28) (0.18) (1.23)
Note: Table 4 shows the results of Equations (2) and (3). The results of Equation (1) are displayed in columns 1
and 2 for the EMU and the UK, respectively. Column 3 presents the results of Equation (3) for the EMU. The first
six rows display the annual coefficients of corporate governance (CG). The last row presents the time–series 
statistics. T statistics are stated in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
the time-series coefficients of corporate
governance are significantly negative. In
the ROE regressions, the annual
corporate governance coefficients are all
negative, though insignificant. For NPM,
five out of six CG coefficients are
negative. In the UK, the results do not
provide evidence of a relationship
between corporate governance and
performance. As shown in Table 6, both
the time-series coefficients are negative,
but they are statistically insignificant.
Further, the annual coefficients do not
display a clear pattern. While there are
several possible explanations why a
relationship between corporate
governance and performance in the UK
cannot be found, the EMU results are
puzzling. Prior to suggesting possible
explanations, it is investigated whether
the EMU results are biased by country
effects. Therefore, regression Equations
(4) and (5) were re-estimated including
country dummies instead of sector
dummies:
NPMit  1CGit2BMit
3CDitit (6)
(NPMit) and ROE (ROEit). Exactly as in
the previous parts, the sample is split into
firms incorporated in the EMU and UK
firms. In line with Gompers et al. (2003),
the following regression equation is
estimated for every year t:4
NPMit  1CGit2BMit
3SDitit (4)
where CGit is the firm’s corporate
governance rating, BMit is the logarithm
of the BM and SDit is a vector of sector
dummies. The regression equation
employing ROEit as measure of
performance is
ROEit  1CGit2BMit
3SDitit (5)
where all explanatory variables are
defined as in Equation (4). These
regressions are estimated annually from
1996 to 2001. Following Fama and
MacBeth (1973), the time-series mean
and t statistics are computed.
Table 5 presents the results of the
EMU sample. Contradicting expectations,
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Table 5 Corporate governance and firm performance: EMU
NPM ROE
Year CG coefficient CG coefficient
1996 –0.12 –0.08
(–1.12) (–0.96)
1997 –0.17 –0.08
(–1.61) (–0.90)
1998 –0.20* –0.05
(–2.01) (–0.55)
1999 –0.06 0.04
(–0.61) (0.38)
2000 –0.10 –0.11
(–1.11) (–1.21)
2001 –0.03 –0.12
(–0.41) (–1.68)
Mean –0.14** –0.07*
(–4.44) (–2.94)
Note: Table 5 shows the results of Equations (4) and (5) for firms incorporated in the EMU. The results of
Equation (4) are displayed in column 1. Column 2 presents the results of Equation (5). The first six rows display
the annual coefficients of corporate governance (CG). The last row presents the time–series statistics. T statistics
are stated in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
and
ROEit  1CGit2BMit
3CDitit (7)
where CDit is a vector of country
dummies and all other variables are
defined as in Equations (4) and (5)
above.
As Table 7 shows, the inclusion of
country dummies does not substantially
alter the findings with respect to the
EMU sample. Despite the fact that the
ROE time-series coefficient of corporate
governance is no longer statistically
significant, the time-series coefficients of
corporate governance remain negative for
both specifications. Further, the CG
coefficient in the NPM regression is still
significantly negative at the 1 per cent
level.
Overall, the results with respect to the
relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance in the
Eurozone are contrary to expectations.
One possible explanation could be that
accounting numbers are biased measures
of firm performance. Both proxies are
based on reported accounting earnings. A
negative correlation between earnings
and corporate governance possibly
implies that badly governed companies
report less conservative earnings
estimates. As recent corporate scandals
showed, managers tend to use their
latitude to overstate earnings. Obviously,
this hypothesis requires further
investigation.
Conclusions and implications
This paper analysed the relationship
between different governance standards
and stock returns, firm value and
operating performance for most firms
included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 in
2000 and 2001. Although a limited
history of corporate governance ratings
was available, the results give first insights
regarding the impact of corporate
governance in Europe.
When the evidence on the relationship
between corporate governance and firm
value as well as equity returns is
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Table 6 Corporate governance and firm performance: UK
NPM ROE 
Year CG coefficient CG coefficient
1996 –0.83 0.02
(–0.55) (0.18)
1997 –0.75 –0.22
(–0.49) (–1.46)
1998 –0.61 0.08
(–0.38) (0.81)
1999 0.32 0.10
(0.20) (0.76)
2000 0.00 –0.06
(0.02) (–0.38)
2001 0.01 0.07
(0.04) (0.60)
Mean –0.31 –0.00
(–1.58) (–0.05)
Note: Table 6 shows the results of Equations (4) and (5) for the UK The results of Equation (4) are displayed in
column 1. Column 2 presents the results of Equation (5). The first six rows display the annual coefficients of 
corporate governance (CG). The last row presents the time–series statistics. T statistics are stated in 
parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
poorer governance standards. This result
is in line with prior empirical research
discussed above, which also demonstrated
that the lower the governance standards,
the stronger the relationship between
governance and firm value.
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Notes
1 McKinsey and Company, July 2002, McKinsey
Global Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate
Governance, Key Findings, Exhibit 1, 3 and 4,
available on: www.mckinsey.com
2 The authors are aware that this procedure will
introduce look-ahead bias and survivorship bias in
the analysis, but given the constrained data history,
extending the ratings backwards is perceived as the
best possible solution. To reduce the impact of these
biases on the results, the time period is limited to a
maximum of four years.
combined, substantial differences are
found between the UK market and the
Eurozone markets. While economically
large excess returns to a zero-investment
corporate governance strategy in the UK
were found, no evidence was found of a
relationship between governance and
firm valuation. This result indicates that
the UK market is still adjusting. In the
long run, the excess returns to corporate
governance should translate into a higher
firm valuation for better-governed firms.
In the EMU, the excess returns to a
corporate governance strategy were much
smaller, particularly after correcting for
country effects. Instead, a stronger
relationship was found between
governance and firm value. This
evidence might imply that current
corporate governance standards have, to a
large extent, already been incorporated in
stock prices. The reason why investors in
Eurozone companies already accounted
more for a firm’s governance standards
than UK investors did could be
explained by the fact that Eurozone
countries traditionally tend to have
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Table 7 Corporate governance and firm performance: EMU (regressions including country dummies)
NPM ROE
Year CG coefficient CG coefficient
1996 –0.10 0.06
(–0.83) (0.68)
1997 –0.15 –0.08
(–1.22) (–0.82)
1998 –0.17 0.01
(–1.50) (0.13)
1999 –0.12 0.02
(–1.02) (0.21)
2000 –0.00 –0.12
(–0.01) (–1.10)
2001 –0.02 –0.04
(–0.22) (–0.46)
Mean –0.09** –0.02
(–3.33) (–0.88)
Note: Table 7 shows the results of Equations (6) and (7) for the EMU. The results of Equation (6) are displayed in
column 1. Column 2 presents the results of Equation (7). The first six rows display the annual coefficients of 
corporate governance (CG). The last row presents the time-series statistics. T statistics are stated in 
parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
3 Equally weighted instead of value-weighted returns
were computed to avoid larger companies
determining the findings.
4 Differing from Gompers et al. (2003), the authors
use the current year BM. The main problem
inherent in the corporate governance data is
survivorship bias. Hence, using the current year BM
minimises this problem compared with the use of
lagged accounting data. Since the main purpose of
this analysis is to find out whether corporate
governance has an impact on performance as
measured by ROE and NPM and not how good
investors’ prediction skills are, this should not
severely affect the conclusions. Another difference
between the present analysis and that of Gompers et
al. (2003) is that the present sample is truncated to
mitigate the impact of outliers. Gompers et al.
(2003) perform median-deviation regressions instead.
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